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APPLICATION OF SECTION 12(A)(2) OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 TO FREE
WRITING PROSPECTUSES AFTER THE




N Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., the Supreme Court struck a seemingly
decisive blow to private investors' rights, holding that section 12(2)1
prospectus liability applied solely to public offerings.2 Rejecting the
view of numerous lower courts, which had for years applied such liability
to both public and private offerings, Gustafson effectively cut-off liability
for a vast swath of unregistered securities transactions.
Despite the Supreme Court's narrowing of the application of 12(a)(2)
with respect to the types of offerings covered, the Security and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC") liberalization of registration rules in December of
2005 has the potential to open a new and potentially deeper vein of
12(a)(2) litigation. By allowing well-known seasoned issuers to issue free
writing prospectuses in the pre-filing period and other issuers to do so in
the post-filing period, the SEC has bestowed both a blessing and curse on
issuers, simultaneously allowing them to speak more freely during or
around an offering period while also burdening them with 12(a)(2) liabil-
ity for any material misstatement or omission in offering materials that
lack the rigidity in disclosure and other statutorily specified requirements
present in the old rules and required in section 10(a) prospectuses. None-
* David B. Gail, Princeton University, AB 2003, Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law, JD expected May 2008. The author wishes to thank Marc Stein-
berg, Rupert & Lillian Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law, for suggesting this topic and providing initial guidance, and Robert L. Kim-
ball, Vinson & Elkins LLP, for his kind assistance. Any errors or omissions, however, are
my own.
1. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, now codified as section 12(a)(2). For-
mer section 12(2) and current section 12(a)(2) are hereinafter referred to as "section
12(a)(2)," and the Securities Act of 1933 is hereinafter referred to as the "Securities Act."
2. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995).
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theless, in subjecting these new writings to section 12(a)(2) liability, the
SEC has potentially handed the securities plaintiffs' bar a whole new an-
gle from which to pursue litigation. While most of the issues pertaining to
section 12(a)(2) liability and the SEC's liberalized offering rules have yet
to be litigated, 3 it is hard to imagine these new rules will not significantly
expand the scope of 12(a)(2) litigation and the ancillary doctrines-and
case law-that form its basis.
This comment will consider the effect of the SEC's liberalization of the
registration rules on several fronts. First, it will provide an overview of
section 12(a)(2) and consider the effect of Gustafson, with emphasis paid
to the reasoning behind the Court's decision to hold only registered pub-
lic offerings subject to section 12 liability, thereby excluding secondary
sales, private offerings, and other exempt offerings.
Second, the comment will examine the regime under the old offerings
rules and the benefits and potential pitfalls of the new reforms.
Third, this comment will address the liability concerns to which issuers
and other offering participants are now exposed, including the status of
who is a seller with respect to the issuance of free writing prospectuses.
Particular attention will be paid to the SEC's imposition of "seller" status
on the issuer in primary offerings of securities regardless of the under-
writing method used to sell the securities. Moreover, the comment will
consider which documents may be considered free writing prospectuses,
and therefore subject to section 12 liability, in addition to those specifi-
cally articulated in the SEC's December 2005 rule changes. Because the
SEC did not specifically confine section 12 liability to free writing pro-
spectuses, there is a possibility that research reports and other memo-
randa, whether authored by the issuer, or by others who may be defined
as "sellers," expose their authors to liability under section 12(a)(2).
Finally, the comment will consider the defenses available in a section
12(a)(2) case, both to issuers and other sellers. The reasonable care de-
fense, for instance, available under traditional 12(a)(2) actions, has yet to
be litigated, and the comment will explore how this defense may apply in
the free writing prospectus context. The defenses available for materially
false forward-looking statements contained in free writing prospectuses
will also be explored.
II. SECTION 12(a)(2)
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 is the basis for liability
with respect to free writing prospectuses and other communications now
allowed under the SEC's liberalized offering rules. The text of section
12(a)(2), which imposes liability based on misstatements or omissions in a
prospectus, reads as follows:
In general. Any person who:
3. As of the date of this printing, not a single reported court case or SEC No-Action
Letter has addressed the issues discussed herein.
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(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provi-
sions of section 3, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection
(a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an un-
true statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person purchasing
such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if
he no longer owns the security.4
The key elements-and coordinately, those most often litigated-of a
12(a)(2) claim are relatively simple: the defendant is a seller 5 who offered
or sold a security6 pursuant to a prospectus 7 or oral communication 8 con-
taining a material misstatement or omission 9 of which the plaintiff was
not aware10 and of which the defendant knew or through the exercise of
reasonable care should have known."
4. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006).
5. The only real bar-if it can even be so characterized-to liability section 12(a)(2)
is that the defendant must be a "statutory seller." See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641-42
(1988). Even so, Pinter characterized a "seller" as one who transfers for value or success-
fully solicits the purchase of securities "motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his
own financial interests or those of the securities owners," thus including a paid broker, a
finder who receives a fee, a vendor, and the actual owner (seller). Id. at 647. Though
Pinter initially applied only in the context of section 12(1) cases (now section 12(a)(1)),
subsequent lower court decisions have extended its reach to section 12(a)(2) as well. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989).
The characterization of the issuer as a "seller" pursuant to the new offering rules will be
considered later in this note. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2007).
6. Per Gustafson, the offer must constitute a public offering, a matter to be addressed
in depth hereafter. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 584.
7. Gustafson further refined what constitutes a prospectus for purposes of section 12
liability. Id. at 575-76 ("the word prospectus is a term of art...to refer to public
solicitations").
8. The oral communication must reference, or be made in connection with, the pro-
spectus. Id. at 567-68; see also Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 688
(3d Cir. 1991) ("the fact that 'oral communication' keeps company with 'prospectus' sug-
gests ... that the more general term be limited to conform to the more restrictive term
where consonant with legislative intent. We deduce no evidence that Congress intended an
expansive meaning of oral communication unconnected to the term 'prospectus."').
9. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Simpson v. Se.
Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257, 1258 (5th Cir. 1983) (the standard for materiality with regard to
misstatements is whether an average, prudent investor would consider the truth important
in making an investment decision).
10. See Cohen v. USEC, Inc., 70 F. App'x 679, 687 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding constructive
notice sufficient).
11. See generally Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative Defense of Reasonable Care
Under section 12[a](2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1993).
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Yet behind its faqade of simplicity, section 12(a)(2), by providing rescis-
sionary damages to aggrieved plaintiffs, acts as a powerful tool against
corporate misconduct in the securities offering arena. Unlike either sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act1 2 or section 10(b) (and, coordinately, Rule 10b-5)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,13 both of which permit plaintiffs
to collect only actual damages, section 12(a)(2) has the power to restore
plaintiffs to the financial position they held prior to purchasing the securi-
ties at issue. 14 Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, section
12(a)(2)-again, unlike either section 11 or section 10(b)-requires
neither a causal connection between the material misstatement or omis-
sion and the plaintiff's purchase nor a showing of reliance on that mis-
statement or omission by the plaintiff.15 Even the materiality
requirement takes on a rather pro-plaintiff tilt, requiring only that the
fact be something that a reasonable investor might find significant in
making his investment decision. 16
Section 12(a)(2) contains two further advantages over both section 11
of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"). First, section 12(a)(2) applies to all sellers,17
whereas section 11 delineates a very specific class of potential defendants,
narrowing the scope of any litigious pursuits on the part of aggrieved
plaintiffs. 18 Second, section 12(a)(2) imposes a mere negligence standard
on defendant conduct,19 a far lower standard of proof for a plaintiff than
12. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
14. See Natasha S. Guinan, Note, Nearly a Decade Later: Revisting Gustafson and the
Status of Section 12(a)(2) Liability in the Courts-Creative Judicial Developments and a
Proposal for Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2004).
15. Id.
16. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also Basic v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
17. Or at least "sellers" within the confines of the Court's holding in Pinter. 486 U.S.
at 641-44.
18. Five groups of potential defendants are specifically enumerated in section 11:
(1) Every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) Every person who was a director of (or person performing similar func-
tions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) Every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration state-
ment as being or about to become a director, person performing a similar
function, or partner;
(4) Every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, report or valuation, which pur-
ports to have been prepared or certified by him;
(5) Every underwriter with respect to such security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
19. See Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 526-57 (2d Cir. 1977) ("At the same
time it is now recognized that under Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder... an intent to defraud
criterion is imposed by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We do not understand therefore why the
latter standard should be applied to § 12[a](2)").
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actual fraud, the standard required by section 10(b) (and Rule 10b-5). 20
In short, section 12(a)(2), at least until 1995, provided plaintiffs who had
purchased a security pursuant to a prospectus containing a material mis-
statement or omission a readily accessible-and friendly-cause of
action.
Gustafson, however, ostensibly acted as a means by which to counter
this sweeping private right of action. Some have argued that the Justices,
in limiting section 12(a)(2)'s reach, inserted their own policy biases to
effect an outcome-driven opinion-one predicated on the need to limit
securities suits by disgruntled shareholders.21 The irony is that the SEC's
liberalized offering rules have perhaps reinvigorated the very malady the
Supreme Court tried to cure.
III. GUSTAFSON V. ALLOYD CO.
The literature on Gustafson is vast, and only a cursory review of the
landmark ruling is necessary for the purposes of this comment. Gustaf-
son shook the securities world when it held that only public offerings are
subject to section 12 liability, ostensibly "creat[ing] more questions than it
resolves.'22 But at its most basic level, Gustafson was a case about statu-
tory interpretation, most specifically the meaning of prospectus. The
term prospectus, which finds itself at the crux of section 12(a)(2)'s convo-
luted construction, derives its meaning from two separate sections of the
1933 Act: section 2(a)(10) 23 and section 10.24 These two sections, and
their interplay with section 12(a)(2), confounded the lower courts in the
years leading up to Gustafson.
Gustafson grew out of the diametrically opposed rulings by the Third
Circuit in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.25 and the Seventh
Circuit in Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co.2 6
In Ballay, a federal court for the first time read the 1933 Act to apply
only to initial offerings of securities. Most significantly, the court focused
20. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976).
21. According to Justice Thomas, "The majority's concern [is] that extending 12[a](2)
to secondary and private transactions might result in an unwanted increase in securities
litigation." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 594 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also Guinan, supra note 14, at 1069. One commentator noted the "substantial upswing...
in the number of cases brought under 12[a](2)" in the years immediately preceding Gustaf-
son as a partial basis for the Court's fractured decision. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities
Act section 12[a](2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231, 1234 (1995).
22. Krista R. Bowen, Note, A Cloudy Prospectus: The Supreme Court's Problematic
Reasoning in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 53 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1041, 1092 (1996).
23. Section 2(a)(10), which is the definition, reads in part: "The term 'prospectus'
means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or
by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any secur-
ity." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2006).
24. Section 10, while not definitional, sets forth the contents of a prospectus-both the
preliminary prospectus, which accompanies an offer for sale, and the final (or statutory)
prospectus, which must be delivered (or, now, given access to) upon confirmation of sale.
Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006).
25. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
26. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993).
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on Congress' use of the word prospectus throughout the 1933 Act.27 Re-
lying in large part on the legislative history of the 1933 Act, the Third
Circuit refined its focus, concluding that the term prospectus could only
mean those communications offered in connection with an initial offering
of securities.28 The court found support for its reasoning in House Re-
port 85 of the 1933 Act, which concluded:
The bill affects only new offerings of securities sold through the use
of the mails or of instrumentalities of interstate or foreign transpor-
tation or communication. It does not affect the ordinary redistribu-
tion of securities unless such redistribution takes on the
characteristics of a new offering by reason of the control of the issuer
possessed by those responsible for the offering.29
The 1933 Act, at its simplest level, was an attempt to protect investors
from unscrupulous promoters and profiteers who, leading up to the 1929
stock market crash, unloaded millions of dollars in worthless securities on
an unsuspecting public market. 30 The Ballay court's application of sec-
tion 12[a](2) solely to initial offerings was meant to be interpreted as a
natural extension of Congress' clear intent. "'Prospectus,"' the Ballay
court concluded, is "a term of art which describes the transmittal of infor-
mation concerning the sale of a security in an initial distribution. In addi-
tion to its definition, the use of the term 'prospectus' in various sections
of the 1933 Act supports a reading restricted to initial distributions." '3 1
Pacific Dunlop refuted Ballay's conclusion, holding instead that "sec-
tion 12[a](2) [liability] includes secondary market transactions. ' 32 Read-
ing the term prospectus far more broadly than the court in Ballay had
done, the Seventh Circuit reached the conclusion that "[a] prospectus
thus includes a contract of sale or any other kind of written communica-
tion that disposes of a security," be it in an initial offering or in a secon-
dary market transaction.33 The Seventh Circuit adhered to a textual
analysis rather than the legislative intent underlying the Third Circuit's
decision in Ballay, focusing not on the type of communication but rather
on its substance.34 Having chosen this interpretive methodology, the Sev-
enth Circuit could come to no other conclusion than one that applied
27. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688.
28. Id.
29. Bowen, supra note 22, at 1046 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7. (1933), reprinted in 2 J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 18, at 5 (1973)). For a good but brief
analysis of Ballay, see Bowen, supra note 22, at 1046.
30. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690 ("The 'object' of the 1933 Act informs our view of
section 12[a](2). During the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, Congress sought to
stabilize the market and reduce fraud . . . by establishing registration and disclosure re-
quirements designed in part to protect investors from fraud . .
31. Id. at 688.
32. Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc., 993 F.2d at 582.
33. Id. at 583.
34. Id. at 588; see also Bowen, supra note 22, at 1050.
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section 12(a)(2) to both initial offerings and secondary market
transactions. 35
Gustafson should have simply resolved the circuit schism, addressing
whether 12(a)(2) covers only initial offerings or secondary market trans-
actions as well. A strictly historical analysis of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
may have been sufficient to solve this conflict: most scholars agree the
1933 Act was devised with the intention of regulating initial offerings,
whereas the 1934 Act was drafted to regulate the trading in securities
after they entered the market.36 The analysis, one supposes, could have
ended there.
But Gustafson redefined the debate among the circuits, shifting the
question from initial and secondary offerings to whether section 12(a)(2)
applied equally to public sales and to private agreements. 37 The specific
issue in Gustafson was whether section 12(a)(2) applied to private trans-
actions where no registration statement need be filed. Because section
12(a)(2) only applies to misstatements "by means of a prospectus or oral
communication," the Court had to determine whether a stock purchase
agreement between two parties to a private transaction constituted a pro-
spectus within the context of section 12.38
The Court held, in a 5-4 decision 39 (and much to the surprise of practi-
tioners and academics), 40 that the term prospectus in section 12[a](2) did
not cover the private stock purchase agreement at issue in the case.41 In
his much criticized opinion, 42 Justice Kennedy focused on the meaning of
prospectus throughout the 1933 Act-in section 2(a)(10), section 10, and
section 12(a)(2). 43 Rather than considering the term in isolation within
each section, however, Kennedy believed it necessary to give it one
meaning: "In seeking to interpret the term 'prospectus,' we adopt the pre-
mise that the term should be construed, if possible, to give it a consistent
35. Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc., 993 F.2d at 595 ("Nothing in the structure of the 1933
Act, the context of section 12 or in the legislative history otherwise requires a definition of
prospectus different from that stated in section 2[a](10).").
36. Bowen, supra note 22, at 1066-67; see also Robert A. Prentice, Section 12[a](2): A
Remedy for Wrongs in the Secondary Market?, 55 ALB. L. REv. 97, 117-18 (1991).
37. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 564 (1995); see also Bowen, supra note 22,
at 1052.
38. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568.
39. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
and Souter, and former Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer and
Scalia formed the minority, with Justices Thomas and Ginsburg delivering dissenting
opinions.
40. See Guinan, supra note 14, at 1059.
41. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578 ("The intent of Congress and the design of the statute
require that § 12[a](2) liability be limited to public offerings.").
42. See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 22, at 1079; Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1270 (argu-
ing that Kennedy's opinion "is at best bizarre and borders on the irresponsibly unintel-
ligible"). Even an ardent supporter of the outcome of Gustafson has soundly criticized its
reasoning saying "the route the court took to get [to my position] strikes me, as it struck
the four dissenting Justices, as highly problematic." Elliott J. Weiss, Securities Act section
12[a](2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain?, 50 Bus. LAW. 1209, 1210
(1995).
43. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568.
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meaning throughout the Act. That principle," he continued, "follows
from our duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions." 44 Yet despite
Kennedy's seemingly earnest desire to give the term its proper meaning,
his first analytical decision appears somewhat misguided; whereas it is
section 2(a)(10) that defines prospectus, Kennedy began his analysis in
section 10, a section of the Securities Act that stipulates not so much what
a prospectus is but rather what a prospectus must contain.45
In Kennedy's words, section 10 was crucial to resolving the discordant
"definitions" of prospectus because it "instruct[s] us what a prospectus
cannot be if the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent
meaning throughout. '46 According to Kennedy, if a section 10 prospec-
tus is a document that must include the "information contained in the
registration statement, '47 and if, "[b]y and large, only public offerings by
an issuer of a security... require the preparation and filing of registration
statements," then logic necessarily dictated that a "prospectus" could
only mean a document prepared as part of a public offering.48 Because
the private sale agreement did not-and need not49-include the type of
information required in a registration statement, the Court held the
agreement not to be a prospectus subject to section 12 liability.50
Largely missing from the majority's reasoning, but curiously enough
the focus of the two dissenting opinions, was any consideration of section
2(a)(10), the very part of the Securities Act that speaks directly to the
meaning of prospectus.51 Addressing it briefly, but only after considering
section 10 (a section which, naturally and numerically, follows the defini-
tional section), Kennedy approached the Act's actual definition of pro-
spectus only as a means to refute Alloyd's argument, one informed by a
seemingly natural reading of section 2(a)(10)'s language. 52 Kennedy but-
tressed his argument by noting that the Securities Act was drafted at a
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006).
46. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568-69.
47. Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1) (2006).
48. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
49. Id. ("[T]he contract is not a prospectus under § 10. That does not mean that a
document ceases to be a prospectus whenever it omits a required piece of information. It
does mean that a document is not a prospectus within the meaning of that section if, absent
an exemption, it need not comply with § 10's requirements in the first place.").
50. Id. at 570.
51. Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 572-74. Kennedy's refutation of Alloyd's argument rested on his application
of noscitur a sociis, meaning that a word is known by the company it keeps. This doctrine,
according to Kennedy, forced him to reject Alloyd's contention that "communication"
could be read in isolation, separate from the preceding list of demonstrably written com-
munications (i.e. notices, circulars, advertisements and letters). Kennedy argued:
Alloyd's contrary argument rests to a significant extent on § 2[a](10), or, to
be more precise, on one word of that section. Section 2[a](10) provides that
"the term 'prospectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement,
letter or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security .... In Alloyd's view,
§ 2[a](10) gives the term prospectus a capacious definition.... The flaw in
[Vol. 60
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time when a prospectus was widely considered to mean "a document
soliciting the public to acquire securities from the issuer," thereby includ-
ing the word "communication" not as a separate species but rather a sub-
genre, of sorts, of the various "documents of wide dissemination" con-
templated as actionable under section 12(a)(2) by the enacting
Congress. 53
Kennedy's critique of Alloyd's reliance on section 2(a)(10) similarly ac-
ted as a foil to Justice Thomas's strongly worded dissent, one which ques-
tioned not only the majority's reading of the 1933 Act's language but also
the analytical framework of the majority's reasoning. 54 Justice Thomas
questioned the logical structure upon which the majority rested its argu-
ment: "In contrast to the majority's approach of interpreting the statute, I
believe the proper method is to begin with the provision actually involved
in the case, § 12[a](2), and then turn to the 1933 Act's definitional sec-
tion, § 2[a](10), before consulting the structure of the Act as a whole."55
In contrast to Kennedy's rejection of the broad scope of section 2(a)(10),
Thomas believed no other definition for prospectus was possible except
for that found in the Act's very clearly delineated definitional section:
"[T]here is no reason to seek the meaning of 'prospectus' outside of the
1933 Act, because Congress has supplied such a definition in
§ 2(a)(10). '5 6
It is this single section that provides support for Justice Thomas's belief
that a prospectus for section 12(a)(2) purposes cannot apply solely in the
context of public offerings. Indeed it is the same laundry list of docu-
ments construed by Justice Kennedy as limiting the scope of the term
prospectus that provides the basis for Justice Thomas's contrary read-
ing.57 Also in direct contrast to the majority's reasoning, Justice Thomas
argued that Congress very clearly intended multiple meanings for pro-
spectus within the 1933 Act, with section 2(a)(10) providing the broad
and expansive definition and section 10, among others, narrowing that
definition.58
Alloyd's argument, echoed in the dissenting opinions, is its reliance on one
word of the definitional section in isolation.
Id. at 573-74.
53. Id. at 575-76. "[Tlhe word 'prospectus' is a term of art, which accounts for con-
gressional confidence in employing what might otherwise be regarded as a partial circular-
ity in the formal, statutory definition." Id. at 576.
54. See id. at 574 ("The flaw in Alloyd's argument, echoed in the dissenting opin-
ions... ").
55. Id. at 584.
56. Id. at 585.
57. Id. at 585-86 ("We should use § 2[a](10) to define 'prospectus' for the 1933 Act,
rather than, as the majority does, use the 1933 Act to define 'prospectus' for § 2[a](10).").
Justice Thomas goes further, rejecting the majority's seemingly unnecessary application of
noscitur a sociis, arguing that "The canon applies only in cases of ambiguity, which I do not
find in § 2[a](10)." Id. at 586.
58. Compare id. at 588 ("it is absolutely clear that the 1933 Act uses 'prospectus' in
two different ways") with id. at 568 ("[T]he term should be construed, if possible, to give it
a consistent meaning throughout the Act."). See also Guinan, supra note 14, at 1064-65.
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Section 12(a)(2), however, contains none of the constraints imposed
upon a prospectus in section 10; rather, anyone who offers or sells a se-
curity "by means of a prospectus" subjects himself to potential liability-
be it as part of a public or private offering of securities. 59 Justice Gins-
burg, joining in Justice Thomas's opinion and writing separately, intro-
duced further criticism for the majority opinion, reasoning that Congress
had a very clear and direct opportunity to limit prospectus to only public
offering documents.60 Ginsburg's historical argument focused on two
documents: the British Companies Act, the basis for its American
cousin,61 and the House Conference Report. 62 The former, she notes,
included "language limiting prospectuses to communications 'offering
[securities] to the public."' 63 Yet while the 1933 Act grew out of the Brit-
ish Companies Act, Ginsburg found it curious that no mention is made in
the House Report of the term prospectus, neither in the way contem-
plated by the British Companies Act nor in the manner articulated in
section 10.64 In short, Justice Ginsburg concluded, section 12(a)(2) was
never intended to be limited to public offerings.
Many commentators have noted that the reaction to Gustafson was al-
most uniformly negative. 65 Some have suggested that the majority's insis-
tence to define a prospectus "consistently throughout" was but a thinly
veiled means by which to apply section 10's narrow and constrained defi-
nition of prospectus-a means of reaching a policy-based result to a prob-
lem not all agreed existed. 66 Yet despite the Court's evident desire to
curtail what it perceived to be a flood of 12(a)(2) litigation, it is now
bound, owing largely to the new offering rules that the SEC recently en-
acted, to see its lower courts flooded with an entirely new species of sec-
tion 12(a)(2)-based litigation, perhaps forcing it to reconsider not only
Gustafson but Pinter as well.
IV. THE OLD OFFERING RULES
Before any discussion of the effect of the recently-enacted offering rule
reforms, it is necessary to consider public offerings under the old regime.
59. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 586-87.
60. Id. at 599-600 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 599 (arguing that the drafters "determined to take as the base of [their]
work the English Companies Act") (citing James M. Lanis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1959)).
62. See id. at 600 (citing H. R. CONF. REP. No. 152, 73D CONG., lST SESS. (1933)).
63. Id.
64. Id. ("This conspicuous omission suggests that the drafters intended the defined
term 'prospectus' to reach beyond communications used in public offerings.").
65. See, e.g., Guinan, supra note 14, at 1066.
66. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1254. Some have also suggested that securities
litigation was not necessarily increasing in general, but rather section 12(a)(2) litigation
was simply the preferred means of redress owing to various Supreme Court decisions limit-
ing the applicability of other remedial actions. See id. at 1252-53. The Court, as noted,
took no pains to hide its feelings on the matter, noting the "vast" and "extensive" liability
that may arise should "prospectus" be defined as the dissent would do. Gustafson, 513
U.S. at 572, 579.
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The 1933 Act was designed to protect investors from unscrupulous pro-
moters and, to that end, prized disclosure above all other virtues.67 As
Justice Louis Brandeis noted, and those drafting the Act surely consid-
ered: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman. '68
The offering rules prior to the 2005 reforms sought to protect this ideal,
shielding investors from sales-related communications that might be
fraught with inaccuracies before the filing of a registration statement. Is-
suers were prohibited from making any oral or written offers (a term to
which the SEC has afforded broad meaning) in the pre-filing period.69
The idea behind such a prohibition was to restrict the flow of superfluous
information to investors in the period before an issuer filed a registration
statement, which would include the contents of a section 10 prospectus,
with the SEC.70 Though "sunlight" may generally be the best policy, one
can imagine how too much light did not serve the purposes of the 1933
Act.
Once a registration statement had been filed, but before it became ef-
fective (the "waiting period"), an issuer had a bit more leeway with re-
spect to communicating with potential investors. Written offers,
prohibited during the pre-filing period, were allowed in the waiting pe-
riod, with the requirement that they be made pursuant to a statutory
(preliminary) prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10.71 This
requirement satisfied the purpose of the Act by providing sufficient infor-
mation-not to mention actionable information, should it contain a mate-
rial misstatement or omission-for the investing public to digest.72 But
67. Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regula-
tion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 363 n. 133 (2006) (citing S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933)). In
more clear words, the Senate committee debating the bill affirmed:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public .... The aim is to
prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent,
and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and
true information before the investor; . . . to restore the confidence of the
prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into pro-
ductive channels of industry and development capital which has grown timid
to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring
buying and consuming power.
Id.
68. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1932) (1914); see also Cross & Prentice, supra note 67, at 363
n.134.
69. See Broc Romanek & Julie Hoffman, A New Day Dawning for E-Communications
During the Offering Process, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 365, 368 (2006).
70. The prohibition against offers in the pre-filing period did not restrain the flow of
all information; negotiations between underwriters and issuers or among underwriters
were allowed. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 17 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2006). Moreo-
ver, the SEC, by rule, exempted further communications. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.135
(2007) (allowing an issuer to announce a proposed offering pursuant to the issuer including
only the information specifically delineated in the rule).
71. See Romanek & Hoffman, supra note 69, at 368.
72. Justice Douglas once explained that "[a]ll the [Securities] Act pretends to do is to
require the 'truth about securities' at the time of issue, and to impose a penalty for failure
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the waiting period, it must be noted, contained only a prohibition on the
use of the mails or interstate commerce to sell a security or to transmit a
prospectus not in compliance with section 10.73 Consequently, those
communications the SEC had exempted from being categorized as offers
or prospectuses (for example, Tombstone Ads74 and ordinary course of
business communications) were still permitted in most instances.75
The period after which the registration became effective (the "post-
effective period") afforded issuers the greatest leeway to communicate
with the investing public. During this period, additional written offering
materials could be used if they were preceded or accompanied by a pro-
spectus that met the requirements of section 10 of the Securities Act.76
Sales or confirmation of sales need only be accompanied or preceded by
a final section 10(a) prospectus. 77
While the pre-reform regime did little to restrain the dissemination of
written materials, including offers, in the offering and post-effective peri-
ods, it prevented many issuers-particularly large, multi-national, heavily
traded companies who viewed themselves as likely plaintiff litigation or
government enforcement targets because of their size-from filing a re-
gistration statement. In an age when electronic communications allowed
for the rapid and broad marketing of everything from shoelaces to books,
the ability to market securities inexpensively and efficiently was sorely
lacking.78 The new offering rules, effective December 1, 2005, liberalized
their antiquated ancestors, ushering out "unnecessary and outmoded re-
strictions on offerings," but also ushering in potential pitfalls for those
brave enough to take advantage of their new found freedom.79
V. THE NEW OFFERING RULES
At its heart, the offering rules proposed in November of 200480 and
adopted in 2005 were meant to "provide more timely investment infor-
mation to investors without mandating delays in the offering process that
we believe would be inconsistent with the needs of issuers for timely ac-
cess to capital."'81 Of preeminent concern to the SEC seemed to be the
to tell the truth." After that, "the matter is left to the investor." William 0. Douglas &
G.E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171, 171 (1933). The timing of
permissible offers under the old rules would seem to satisfy Douglas's assessment of the
regulation regime.
73. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
74. Rule 134 Statements. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2007).
75. See Romanek & Hoffman, supra note 69, at 370.
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2006).
77. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006).
78. See Romanek & Hoffman, supra note 69, at 366.
79. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug.
3, 2005) [hereinafter "Reform Rules"].
80. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8501, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 50,624, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,649, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392 (Nov.
17, 2004) [hereinafter "Reform Proposals"].
81. Id.; Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,722.
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anachronistic restrictions imposed on well-known seasoned issuers in the
pre-filing period and all issuers in the post-filing period (including both
the waiting and post-effective periods). 82
In amending its offering rules, the SEC first distinguished various clas-
ses of filers: well-known seasoned issuers,83 Seasoned Issuers, 84 Unsea-
soned Issuers,85 and Non-Reporting Issuers.86
The first of the two most significant changes in the offering rules was
the freedom accorded to well-known seasoned issuers during the pre-fil-
ing period87 and all issuers (except ineligible issuers) in the waiting and
post-effective periods 88 by the introduction of free writing prospectuses.
In contrast to the old offering rules, the new rules permit well-known
seasoned issuers to make oral and written offers in the pre-filing period
without those offers being considered "gun jumping" in violation of sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act.89 These statements, as with most all commu-
82. See, e.g., Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,731 ("The capital markets, in the
United States and around the world, have changed very significantly since [the gun-jump-
ing] limitations were enacted.").
83. Issuers who are required to file reports pursuant to section 13(a) or section 15(d)
of the Exchange Act and who meet the following requirements are well-known seasoned
issuers:
* the issuer must meet the registrant requirements of Form S-3 or Form F-3
" the issuer either:
" as of a date within 60 days of its eligibility determination date must have
a worldwide market value of its outstanding voting and non-voting com-
mon equity held by non-affiliates of $700 million or more; or
° as of a date within 60 days of its eligibility determination date, must have
issued in the last three years, at least $1 billion aggregate principal
amount of non-convertible securities, other than common equity, in pri-
mary offerings for cash, not exchange, registered under the Securities
Act; and
" the issuer must not be an ineligible issuer.
Id. at 44,727. Though making up only 30% of listed issuers, well-known seasoned issuers
accounted for about 95% of U.S. equity market capitalization and more than 96% of the
total debt raised in registered offerings since 1998. It is presumed that they are the "most
widely followed [issuers] in the marketplace." Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007).
84. Seasoned issuers are those with market floats between $75 million and $700 mil-
lion, thereby making them eligible to use Form S-3 or F-3. Reform Rules, supra note 79,
at 44,727.
85. Unseasoned issuers are those that are required to file reports pursuant to section
13(a) or section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, but do not-because they fail to meet the $75
million market float threshold-satisfy the requirements of Form S-3 or Form F-3 for a
primary offering of their securities. Id. at 44,731.
86. A non-reporting issuer is one that is not required to file reports pursuant to section
13 or section 15(d) of the Exchange Act; voluntary filers are also classified as "non-report-
ing issuers." Id. A final category of issuer is the "Ineligible Issuer." Because these issuers
are not permitted to use the free writing prospectus, they will not be considered in this
comment. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007).
87. See Commission Announcements-SEC Votes to Adopt Securities Act Rule Reform
and Shell Company Regulations, SEC NEws DIGEST, July 5, 2005, at 22-23.
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.164 (2007).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2007) (exempting certain communications by or on behalf of
well-known seasoned issuers from section 5(c) requirements). As some commentators
have noted, the new offering rules make it such that well-known seasoned issuers will
likely always have effective "shelf" registration statements on file with the SEC, thereby
precluding the need actually to "make an offer" as such an act is generally considered. See
Romanek & Hoffman, supra note 69, at 371.
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nications made by a well-known seasoned issuer in the pre-filing period,
are now classified as free writing prospectuses. 90
The second significant change under the new rules is that all issuers
may make offers pursuant to free writing prospectuses in the post-filing
period, a significant departure from the old rules permitting written offers
only by way of a section 10 statutory prospectus. 91 This latter change is
expected to radically alter the means by which issuers offer, market, and
sell new issues of securities to the investing public.
Free writing prospectuses are potentially the "400-pound gorilla" of the
new offering rules. A free writing prospectus, defined by Rule 405, is
effectively any written 92 communication for a public offering that is an
offer to sell or buy a security which falls outside the requirements of a
section 10(a) statutory prospectus. 93 The potential forms of a free writing
prospectus are numerous. Moreover, because they need not conform to
the requirements of section 10(a) (though they must adhere to the condi-
tions and limitations of Rule 16394 in the pre-filing period and Rule 16495
and Rule 43396 in the post-filing period), the flexibility accorded issuers
and underwriters in devising and distributing these materials is similarly
voluminous. 97 Free writing prospectuses will be most useful in four dis-
90. Certain communications, however, are specifically exempted from being offers or
prospectuses. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.163A (2007) (communications made more than 30-
days before filing a registration statement that do not refer to an offering); 7 C.F.R.
§ 230.168 (2007) (regularly released factual business and forward looking information); 17
C.F.R. § 230.169 (2007) (regularly released business information).
91. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.164 (2007).
92. The term "written" has taken on specific meaning in light of the new offering rules.
Written now means "any communication that is written, printed, a radio or television
broadcast, or a graphic communication .. " 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007). "Graphic com-
munication" is further defined to include audiotapes, videotapes, and even widely dissemi-
nated (rather than direct, person-to-person) voicemail messages. With respect to radio and
television broadcasts, live events, even when disseminated via one of these media, is not a
graphic communication and thus not subject to the requirements or liability concerns of a
free writing prospectus; recordings of these events that are further disseminated are
graphic communications with the attendant concerns. Id.
93. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007). A free writing prospectus is defined as:
any written communication as defined in this section that constitutes an offer
to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy the securities relating to a registered
offering that is used after the registration statement in respect of the offering
is filed (or, in the case of a well-known seasoned issuer, whether or not such
registration statement is filed) and is made by means other than:
1. A prospectus satisfying the requirements of section 10(a) of the Act,
Rule 430 (§ 230.430), Rule 430A (§230.430A), Rule 430B (§230.430B),
Rule 430C (§230.430C), or Rule 431 (§230.431);
2. A written communication used in reliance on Rule 167 and Rule 426
(§230.167 and §230.426); or
3. A written communication that constitutes an offer to sell or solicita-
tion of an offer to buy such securities that falls within the exception from
the definition of prospectus in clause (a) of section 2(a)(10) of the Act.
Id.; see also Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,744.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2007).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 230.164 (2007).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (2007).
97. Leslie N. Silverman & Jeffrey D. Karpf, The SEC's Securities Offering Reform
Proposals: Will This Ship Sail?, THE REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITES REG., March 23, 2005,
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tinct contexts: (1) to disclose late-breaking information without the bur-
den of preparing and recirculating a revised preliminary prospectus; (2)
to prevent issuers from exposure to section 12(a)(1) liability for inadver-
tent gun-jumping violations; (3) to permit underwriters to communicate
more efficiently and discretely with investors about proposed offerings;
and (4) to provide potential investors with "indicative terms of compli-
cated securities. ' 98 Yet it is this very flexibility-the myriad uses, the
ease of dissemination, and the speed with which issuers and underwriters
can now attract investor attention to specific offerings-that presents the
greatest challenge to the practicality of free writing prospectuses in light
of their exposure to litigation under 12(a)(2).
Before addressing more specific liability concerns with respect to the
use of free writing prospectuses, it is necessary to consider briefly the
information that a free writing prospectus is likely to contain-or, more
appropriate, what it need not contain. Pursuant to Rules 163 and 433, a
free writing prospectus need not contain any specific information other
than a legend.99 Abrogating the need for line-item disclosure was one
significant concession of the SEC.1° ° Even more significant, a free writ-
ing prospectus may contain "information the substance of which is not
included in the registration statement." 10 1 Though nothing in the free
writing prospectus may contradict what is contained in the Final Prospec-
tus, 10 2 the mere fact that issuers and other offering participants can now
use this vehicle to supplement mandatory filings that require more rigid
disclosure and that typically receive close scrutiny from issuers, under-
writers, and their advisors raises the specter not only of the ambiguity of
the contents of a free writing prospectus, but also the risk that too much
or too little disclosure might create a material misstatement or omission,
thus triggering section 12(a)(2) liability.
VI. CERTAIN LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ISSUERS
AND UNDERWRITERS
Several new liability issues have arisen in connection with the liberal-
ized offering rules and their application to section 12(a)(2). Principal
among them are (1) the inclusion of the issuer as a "seller" in almost all
transactions; 10 3 (2) the effect of multiple underwriters issuing and using
free writing prospectuses; (3) the timing of a "sale" for purposes of im-
at 63, 71. The types of offering materials that will be used under the free writing prospec-
tus rule will include, among other things, an issuer's website, a print or broadcast interview
given by the issuer, its officers, directors, or representatives, a press release disseminated
by the issuer or offering participant and rebroadcast by the media, and a paid advertise-
ment by the issuer or any offering participant. Id.
98. Id. at 75.
99. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.163, 230.433 (2007); see also Reform Rules, supra note 79, at
44,748-49.
100. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,748.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(a) and (c) (2007).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c) (2007).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2007).
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puting liability; and (4) the potential application of section 12(a)(2) to
research reports. 10 4
A. ISSUER AS SELLER-PINTER REVISITED
Liability under section 12(a)(2) is predicated, among other things, on
the defendant being a "seller." According to Pinter v. Dahl, a seller is
one who transfers title to the buyer or one who solicits a purchase "moti-
vated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or
those of the securities owners.110 5 Though it seems that issuers should
qualify as sellers under the definition, courts have generally found an is-
suer not liable under section 12(a)(2) because they often fail to meet a
test further articulated in Pinter-that a seller may be liable only if he
directly communicates with a purchaser. 10 6 For as Pinter itself noted, one
may not "recover against [the] seller's seller. '10 7 For example, before the
enactment of the new offering rules, the issuer in a firm commitment un-
derwriting' 0 8 almost always absolved itself of 12(a)(2) liability. 10 9
The new offering rules gutted this protection for issuers. Under Rule
159A, an issuer is a seller for purposes of section 12(a)(2) liability, re-
gardless of the underwriting arrangement in instances where securities
are sold pursuant to "any free writing prospectus ... relating to the offer-
ing and prepared by or on behalf of the issuer or used or referred to by
the issuer .... 110 This rule, which will have the effect of providing plain-
tiffs with access to a greater number of potential defendants, was in-
tended to circumscribe case law that precluded holding an issuer liable
under section 12 simply because it had issued its securities via an interme-
104. Cross-liability issues are addressed in Part VI.B. See infra notes 121-25 and ac-
companying text.
105. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S: 622, 647 (1988).
106. See, e.g., Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 870-71 (5th Cir. 2003);
Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The purchaser must
demonstrate direct and active participation in the solicitation of the immediate sale to hold
the issuer liable as a § 12[a](2) seller.").
107. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 644 n.21 (alteration in original). See also Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d
at 871 n. 11 ("[lIt seems quite clear that § 12 contemplates only an action by a buyer
against his or her immediate seller. That is to say, in the case of the typical firm commit-
ment underwriting, the ultimate investor can recover only from the dealer who sold to him
or her." (citing Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
1147 (4th ed. 2001) (emphasis in original)).
108. In such an agreement, an investment bank agrees to purchase and resell an entire
issue of securities from the issuer. Any unsold securities remain the responsibility of the
underwriter.
109. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzskys Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2001)
("[I]n a firm commitment underwriting, such as this one, the public cannot ordinarily hold
the issuers liable under section 12, because the public does not purchase from the issuers.
Rather, the public purchases from the underwriters, and suing the issuers is an attempt to
recover against the seller's seller."); cf. Shaw v. Digital Equip Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st
Cir. 1996) (holding that under certain circumstances, an issuer overtly involved in soliciting
purchasers in a firm commitment underwriting could be a seller for § 12(a)(2) purposes).




diary, that is, an underwriter."1 This rule presents a number of potential
problems for issuers, foremost among them that issuers may now find
themselves liable for material misstatements or omissions in free writing
prospectuses prepared by their underwriters. As Rule 159A reads, an
issuer could be liable under 12(a)(2) when offering securities pursuant to
"any free writing prospectus.. .related to the offering prepared by or on
behalf of or used or referred to by the issuer .... 1 12 Though the SEC was
quick to note that a participation by an underwriter or dealer in an offer-
ing does not, by itself, mean that the communication made by the under-
writer or dealer is "on behalf of" the issuer, it did not clarify exactly what
"on behalf of" means; nor, for that matter, did it provide particularly
strong guidance with respect to how a due diligence type defense may be
available to issuers for the communications of participating
underwriters."13
Part of the purpose of the new offering rules and the introduction of
free writing prospectuses was to allow more fluid channels of communica-
tion among issuers, underwriters, and investors. But fluidity has also
given rise to competition: in a tight marketplace, underwriters compete
for new issues, prompting worry that such competition may produce more
errors in offering materials, and thus more liability for issuers and under-
writers. Though the SEC has attempted to mitigate issuers' worry by
clarifying, in a note to Rule 159A, that a communication will only be "on
behalf of an issuer if an issuer.. .authorizes or approves the information,"
it is still unclear exactly what "authorizes or approves" will actually mean
in practice."14
One particularly tricky scenario may involve road shows that are re-
broadcast or otherwise disseminated in writing. It is not inconceivable,
for instance, to imagine an officer of a company disseminating informa-
tion provided to him by an underwriter to potential investors. The issue
that would arise in such a scenario, assuming the information contains
some material misstatement or omission, is the extent to which the issuer
is liable for that statement. In such a scenario, the "use" by the com-
pany's officer would seem to satisfy the "on behalf of" language in Rule
159A, thereby subjecting the issuer to liability, even though the issuer is
not a seller under Pinter and the issuer took no active role in preparing
the free writing prospectus. Also, the key language in Rule 159A creat-
ing apparent liability for issuers is the "authorizes or approves" clause. 115
Some practitioners worry that mere review of free writing prospectuses
prepared by underwriters may not only trigger a filing requirement (and
111. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,769 ("The issuer is selling its securities to
the public, although the form of underwriting such offering, such as a firm commitment
underwriting, may involve the sale first by the issuer to the underwriter and then the sale
by the underwriter to the public."). This rule seems to abrogate Pinter's principle that one
cannot recover from one's "seller's seller." See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 644 n.21.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2007) (emphasis added).
113. Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,769.




thus one liability prong) but may also constitute "use. ' 116 Moreover,
there is concern that any review, even that which may be necessary to
ensure the underwriter's free writing prospectus contains no material mis-
statement or omission, may connote something akin to authorization or
approval. 117 The SEC has not alleviated these concerns.
A similarly murky area is the use of websites and hyperlinks. In enact-
ing Rule 159A, the SEC created the predicament whereby issuers may be
liable even for material they never knew existed. For example, if a hyper-
link directs an investor from an issuer's website to an underwriter's web-
site, 118 and the underwriter's site contains a material misstatement or
omission, with respect to the issuer's securities, then the issuer may be
liable for that free writing prospectus, irrespective of the fact that it does
not control the actual content of the hyperlinked page.11 9 In treating
such communications as offers by the issuer subject to section 12(a)(2)
liability, the SEC has placed issuers in a very tenuous position.
B. LIABILITY CONCERNS FOR UNDERWRITERS
Underwriters appear to face just as many liability concerns as issuers
under the new offering rules. A significant worry of issuer and under-
writer counsel prior to the adoption of the rules concerned cross-liabil-
ity. 12 0 Cross-liability concerns arise when multiple underwriters, such as
in a syndicate, are each issuing and using separate free writing prospec-
tuses.121 In the Reform Proposals, the SEC failed to clarify the condi-
tions under which one underwriter would be liable for the use of a free
writing prospectus by another underwriter.' 22 Practitioners latched onto
this deficiency, demanding greater clarity. 123 The scenario that many un-
derwriters feared was that where one underwriter in the group or syndi-
cate published a free writing prospectus containing a material
misstatement or omission, but other underwriters were both unaware of
the statement and never used the free writing prospectus. 124 The finan-
cial community pushed the SEC to include in its final rule release a stipu-
116. Letter from Davis, Polk and Wardell to Jonathan G. Katz, SEC, Regarding Securi-
ties Offering Reform (File No. S7-38-04), at 17 (Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/proposed/s73804/dpw013105.pdf [hereinafter "DPW Letter"].
117. Id.
118. This scenario constitutes a free writing prospectus under the new rules. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 230.433(e)(1) (2007).
119. See Silverman & Karpf, supra note 97, at 75.
120. DPW Letter, supra note 116, at 18; Letter from Goldman Sachs to Jonathan G.
Katz, SEC, Regarding Securities Offering Reform (File No. S7-38-04), at 3 (Feb. 10,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73804/gsO21005.pdf [hereinafter
"Goldman Letter"].
121. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,759.
122. Reform Proposals, supra note 80, at 67,414. See also, Reform Rules, supra note 78,
at 44,759.
123. DPW Letter, supra note 116, at 17 (noting, "Managing underwriters of an offering
may also determine that it is necessary to review free writing prospectuses prepared by
other offering participants. They may believe that it is necessary to review free writing
prospectuses as part of their 'reasonable care' defense under section 12(a)(2).").
124. Id. at 17.
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lation that an underwriter would not be subject to section 12(a)(2)
liability for any free writing prospectus created by the issuer or any other
underwriter-whether it need be or actually was filed-so long as the
underwriter did not send out or use the questionable free writing pro-
spectus when marketing the offering. 125
The SEC's response to these requests may be called mixed, at best,
leaving open the door for liability to attach to underwriters for even the
most tangential "uses" of a coordinating underwriter's flawed free writing
prospectus. 126 In its final rule release, the SEC noted that it had "in-
cluded a new provision in Rule 159A that will clarify when an offering
participant, other than the issuer, is considered to offer and sell securities
'by means' of a free writing prospectus." 127 To be fair, the SEC's final
rule did appear to placate the stated worries of underwriters and their
counsel.1 28
However, for a set of reforms arguably driven by the need for compati-
bility with current technology,1 29 the cross-liability problems seem partic-
ularly glaring. One of the main advantages of the free writing prospectus
is the ability to disseminate offering materials in a rather casual manner,
such as via email, to individual clients. 130 Yet one imagines that under-
writers will have to be particularly careful in what communications they
allow their sell-side analysts to disseminate to investors, since even a cas-
ual mention of another underwriter's free writing prospectus has the pos-
sibility of subjecting the analyst's employer to section 12(a)(2) liability. 131
125. Id. Other practitioners advanced a wholly different agenda, one which would al-
most inextricably link all underwriters in a syndicate together for purposes of section
12(a)(2) liability:
The commission should adopt the presumption that if an underwriter is in a
syndicate, then any FWP that is issued by any other member of that syndi-
cate will bring liability. . . to every other member of that syndicate. The
presumption can be rebutted ... but the burden is on the individual members
of the syndicate....
Letter from David Tuttle to Jonathan G. Katz, SEC, Regarding Securities Offering Reform
(File No. S7-38-04), at 21 (May 13, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73804/dtuttle5246.pdf [hereinafter "Tuttle Letter"].
126. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2007).
127. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,759.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2007). Section 159A(b) states that an underwriter or dealer
has not sold "by means" of a free writing prospectus unless:
i. The offering participant used or referred to the free writing prospectus in
offering or selling the securities to the purchaser;
ii. The offering participant offered or sold securities to the purchaser and
participated in planning for the use of the free writing prospectus by one or
more other offering participants and such free writing prospectus was used or
referred to in offering or selling securities to the purchaser by one or more of
such other offering participants; or
iii. The offering participant was required to file the free writing prospectus
pursuant to the conditions to use in Rule 433.
Id.
129. See Romanek & Hoffman, supra note 69, at 386.
130. Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,725.
131. See Silverman & Karpf, supra note 97, at 75. Such a scenario also has the potential
to dramatically increase the transaction costs for underwriters and issuers, necessitating a
certain level of due diligence on the myriad new offering documents perhaps not contem-
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Such a scenario is especially troubling in light of both the desire for the
reforms and the SEC's stated aim in enacting the new rules, for not only
do the reforms open the door for plaintiffs to pursue section 12(a)(2)
litigation, but they may also give underwriters motivation to remain si-
lent-the very things the reforms were intended to rectify. 132
C. WHEN IS THE "SALE" MADE?
Rule 159 was adopted by the SEC to shield issuers and underwriters
from liability for material misstatements or omissions made after the time
of sale and applies only to liability under section 12(a)(2) and section
17(a)(2). 133 Consequently, it appears that issuers and underwriters who
disseminate free writing prospectuses throughout an offering period may
face different liability to different potential plaintiffs for the same written
communication simply based upon when a free writing prospectus was
issued and when a purchaser "entered into a contract for sale. 134
Though such a narrow remedy would seem to fit a structural reading of
section 12(a)(2), it is unclear whether it comports with the purpose and
spirit of the Securities Act.135
Strong arguments can be made both defending and assailing Rule 159's
narrow application of section 12(a)(2) liability. The argument in favor of
holding an issuer or underwriter liable to a purchaser only for material
misstatements or omissions made in written communications prior to the
purchaser entering into a contract is that there must be a direct connec-
tion between the statement and the decision to enter into a purchase and
sale agreement. 136 However, this argument seems to ignore one of the
key tenets of section 12(a)(2) litigation: reliance by the plaintiff upon the
material misstatement or omission is not necessary. 137
Because a plaintiff need not show reliance upon the prospectus con-
taining a material misstatement or omission, it seems antithetical to ab-
solve issuers and underwriters of liability simply because a plaintiff
purchased early in an offering pursuant to one free writing prospectus
when subsequent information-such as by way of a later written commu-
nication-suggests that the earlier material contained actionable ele-
ments.138 As of yet, no reported cases have addressed this issue, but the
real issue seems to be the extent to which a free writing prospectus (a
permissive document) is entitled to a presumption of reliance under sec-
tion 12(a)(2) in the way a preliminary prospectus (a mandatory docu-
plated. The due diligence and reasonable care-type defenses will be considered later in this
comment. See infra Part VII.
132. See Silverman & Karpf, supra note 97, at 75.
133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159 (2007).
134. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,765-66.
135. See, e.g., Cross & Prentice, supra note 67, at 363 n.133.
136. As noted above, this seems to be a structural reading of section 12(a)(2).
137. See, e.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Neither section 11
nor section 12(a)(2) requires that plaintiffs allege the scienter or reliance elements of a
fraud cause of action.").
138. See Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 6 (questioning the necessity of Rule 159).
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ment) is. In subjecting a free writing prospectus to section 12(a)(2)
liability, the SEC seems to presume reliance, thereby granting the plain-
tiff's bar an effective tool. This was something of a concern to issuers and
underwriters prior to the enactment of the reforms, with one commenter
to the proposed rules worrying to the Commission that "all free writing
prospectuses, regardless of whether or not filed or sent to a limited num-
ber of persons, will give rise to claims that the information influenced the
investment decision of all potential investors."'1 39 Whether the adoption
of the rule has assuaged these fears remains to be seen.
D. FREE WRITING PROSPECTUSES USED IN PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS:
NEED GUSTAFSON BE REVISITED?
Gustafson marked a turning point for 12(a)(2) liability, appearing to
cut-off this once plaintiff-friendly cause of action and shift litigation back
to other remedies which required both a scienter and reliance showing.1 40
One area where the ghost of Gustafson is sure to loom large is with re-
spect to free writing prospectuses issued during a public offering but dis-
seminated to buyers purchasing securities pursuant to a private sales
contract. Under Gustafson, section 12(a)(2) does not apply to private
transactions because such transactions need not comply with the prospec-
tus delivery requirements of the Securities Act and, therefore, such com-
munications are not prospectuses as contemplated by the Act.
141
However, it is hardly inconceivable that free writing prospectuses drafted
and disseminated by underwriters initially for use in a public offering
could be incorporated into the text of offering materials for use in a pri-
vate transaction. In such a scenario, the transaction may be private but
the purchase is ostensibly being made pursuant to what was part of a
public offering and by way of a document that qualifies as a
prospectus. 142
At first glance the problem seems to be resolved by the Supreme
Court's holding in Gustafson. Gustafson dealt with a private sale transac-
tion using offering materials to which no regulations applied, and the
Court drew a distinction between such offering materials and a prospec-
tus, whose contents were outlined in section 10.143 Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion determined the key characteristic of a prospectus for
purposes of section 12(a)(2) liability to be that "information contained in
the registration statement."'1 44 Though he noted that a document does
not "[cease] to be a prospectus whenever it omits a required piece of
information," he made very clear that "a document is not a prospectus
within the meaning of that section if ... it need not comply with § 10's
139. DPW Letter, supra note 116, at 18.
140. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1254.
141. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995).
142. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,759.
143. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
144. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1) (2006).
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requirements in the first place. 14 5
Moreover, in a case decided contemporaneously to enactment of the
new offering rules, Yung v. Lee, the Second Circuit held that a prospectus
prepared for purposes of a public offering but actually used as an offering
document in a private transaction failed to yield plaintiffs' redress via
section 12(a)(2). 146 Parroting Gustafson's reasoning, the court concluded
that "[a] private offering is not effected 'by means of a prospectus' be-
cause Gustafson states that section 12(a)(2) liability cannot attach unless
there is an 'obligation to distribute a prospectus,' and there is no 'obliga-
tion' to distribute a document that describes a public offering to a private
purchaser. ' 147 What this court failed to address-and what no court has
thus far addressed-is whether a document that is not required by law to
be prepared and distributed but that the law authorizes for use in public
offerings (and can be used in private transactions) should be subject to
section 12 liability when used in private transactions.
The free writing prospectus is one such document. In particular, those
disseminated by underwriters and dealers which do not include issuer in-
formation seem to fall outside the scope of Gustafson's reasoning. 148
Under the new offering rules, underwriters need not file free writing pro-
spectuses unless the document contains issuer information or is "broadly
disseminated. ' 149 Because these documents lack any formal require-
ments outside of a legend, it is hard to see how they fall under the same
definition of prospectus promulgated by Gustafson.150 The question then
follows: how can a free writing prospectus distributed by an underwriter
qualify as a prospectus upon which section 12(a)(2) liability is predicated,
but a more formal offering document fail to form the basis for a rescission
suit simply because it is used in the private offering arena? Like most
issues regarding the use and liability concerns related to free writing pro-
spectuses, this issue has yet to be litigated. However, the vast scope of
documents now subject to section 12(a)(2) liability, and the potential for
a boomlet of 12(a)(2) litigation, may force the Court to reassess its rea-
soning in Gustafson.
E. THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF RESEARCH REPORTS
The new offering rules carved out a number of safe harbors for certain
documents, including research reports, 151 exempting such documents
145. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
146. Yung v. Lee, 432 F.3d 142, 147-49 (2d Cir. 2005).
147. Id. at 149.
148. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,750.
149. Id.
150. Interestingly, and without so much as citing a case in support of the proposition,
the SEC states: "section 12(a)(2) ... [does] not require that oral statements or the prospec-
tus or other communication contain all information called for under our line-item disclo-
sure rules or otherwise contain all material information." Reform Rules, supra note 79, at
44,767. Though such a statement may prove true, it is unclear how this statement fits in
with the reasoning in Gustafson.
151. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.137-39 (2007).
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from classification as free writing prospectuses when certain conditions
are satisfied. 152 The SEC believes these safe harbors, available both to
participating dealers and underwriters 53 and non-participating dealers
and underwriters, 154 are valuable tools for the investing community, bal-
ancing the informational needs of investors with the anti-fraud directives
of the Securities Act.1 55
But these safe harbors have the potential to lull issuers, underwriters,
and dealers into a state of complacency where the possibility of acciden-
tally disseminating an offering document may inadvertently subject any
of these groups to section 12(a)(2) liability. Issuers, for example, may be
subject to 12(a)(2) liability for using research reports devised and issued
by underwriters or dealers.' 56 As the SEC noted in its final rule release,
Issuers cannot use the safe harbor provisions for research reports
prepared or distributed by brokers or dealers ... [to] communicate
with potential investors .... For example, a hyperlink on an issuer's
web site during its registered offering to a research report could raise
concerns in this regard. . .[and] could be considered free writing
prospectuses.15 7
Though the SEC has made clear that section 12(a)(2) liability would at-
tach in such situations, it is unclear how the policy underpinnings of the
Securities Act are furthered by holding one entity but not another liable
for using the same document.
The second area where liability may attach to research reports is where
the report fails to satisfy the conditions provided by the new offering
rules. Under such a scenario, the document will likely lose the protec-
tions of the safe harbor, thus qualifying itself as a free writing prospectus
subject to section 12(a)(2) liability. For this reason, in addition to others
already articulated, underwriters and dealers will be very hesitant to al-
low their analysts and brokers to communicate directly with investors
through some of the very channels, such as email, the new offering re-
forms were intended to promote.158
VII. DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
The extent of the uncertainties pertaining to liability exposure are
equaled only by the uncertainty amongst the issuer and underwriter com-
munity with respect to the defenses available for potential section
12(a)(2) violations.1 59 Nonetheless, a number of defenses to liability
should remain available to both issuers and underwriters, including Rule
152. Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,744 n.207.
153. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (2007).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.137 (2007).
155. See Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,761-62.
156. Id. at 44,761 n.352.
157. Id.
158. See Silverman & Karpf, supra note 97, at 75.
159. See, e.g., DPW Letter, supra note 116, at 19 ("The law surrounding free writing
prospectuses is unknown at the moment and without precedent.").
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175 for all free writing prospectuses that are filed with the SEC, 160 pro-
tections afforded issuers and others via the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA"), 161 and-the one most likely to be pleaded-the
"reasonable care defense. ' 162
Both Rule 175 and the PSLRA protect those who make forward-look-
ing statements containing material misstatements or omissions. Neither,
however, applies to issuers' initial public offerings (IPOs). 1 63 Rule 175,
ostensibly less potent as a defense than the PSLRA, provides a defense
for misstatements or omissions in forward-looking statements "unless it is
shown that such statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable
basis or was disclosed other than in good faith."164 Moreover, Rule 175
may only be invoked for documents "filed with the Commission.' '1 65
Consequently, only issuer-issued free writing prospectuses, or those is-
sued by underwriters or dealers that are based on issuer information, will
even have access to Rule 175 protections. Similarly, such protections are
available only where the misstatement or omission is made as part of a
forward-looking statement, 166 meaning that any information not clearly
delineated as forward-looking cannot qualify for protection under this
rule.
Though protections afforded by the PSLRA are similarly limited, the
,PSLRA does provide additional hurdles for plaintiffs pursuing litigation
for materially false forward-looking statements. 167 For one, the PSLRA
provides that a forward-looking statement preceded by "meaningful cau-
tionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual
results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement"
is not actionable at all, except in the case of initial public offerings
("IPOs"). Even where no such language is included, a plaintiff can only
pursue an action where he can demonstrate that the statement "was made
with actual knowledge . . . that the statement was false or misleading"
(that is, with actual fraud). 168 In setting the bar so high for plaintiffs, it
appears that filed free writing prospectuses containing forward-looking
statements will regularly be shielded from liability.
Perhaps the most vexing defense to liability in the context of section
12(a)(2)-and the one which caused the most consternation among com-
menters to the new offering rules169-concerns the "reasonable care" de-
fense available to 12(a)(2) defendants and its interplay with Rule 176.170
160. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2007).
161. Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006).
162. Securities Act of 1933 § 12[a](2)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006).
163. See Securities Act of 1933 §27A(b)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b)(2)(D) (2006); 17
C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(1)(i) (2007).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (2007).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 3, 14.
170. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2007).
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Section 12(a)(2) explicitly provides a reasonable care defense to sell-
ers.171 This standard is admittedly lower than the due diligence require-
ment mandated by section 11.172 Many commenters, however, expressed
concern that the lack of guidance as to what satisfied the reasonable care
requirement would cause many issuers and underwriters to proceed with
such caution that the purpose of the offering rules might be thwarted. 173
The primary concern was with respect to the SEC's continued refusal
to extend Rule 176 to section 12(a)(2). 174 Rule 176 provides a non-exclu-
sive list of factors to assist a court in determining if a defendant in a sec-
tion 11 case has met its burden of "reasonable investigation.' 75 While
the "reasonable care" standard of section 12(a)(2) is lower than that re-
quired by section 11, the SEC has refused to apply Rule 176 to the for-
mer,176 thereby creating significant uncertainty in the securities bar with
respect to the level of due diligence-like investigation required in a sec-
tion 12(a)(2) case.1 77 The SEC once again refused, as it did in 1998, to
mollify these commenters: "We have determined not to propose modifi-
cations to Rule 176 at this time.., we believe that any practices or factors
that would be considered favorably under section 11, including pursuant
to Rule 176, also would be considered as favorably under the reasonable
care standard of section 12(a)(2)."'178 This non-answer answer still leaves
open certain problems for issuers and underwriters, especially in the con-
text of what some have called "fast deals. 1 79
Fast deals, or expedited offers, are not only becoming more prevalent
but, pursuant to the new offering rules, will be easier to market to poten-
tial investors, thereby making them more attractive to issuers and under-
writers. Certain problems are exacerbated in the fast deal context. Most
notably, the ability of underwriters to exercise the level of care necessary
to keep errant information from making its way into offering documents,
or even to meet the basic standard of reasonable care, is compromised by
the time crunch of fast deals and the intense competition between under-
writers in an increasingly competitive market place.' 80 Particularly in of-
ferings with multiple underwriters, the cross-liability issues1 81 create
problems whereby underwriters may be burdened by the need to exercise
reasonable care over the offering materials of their competitors, not
knowing whether or not they will be liable for their competitors' state-
171. Securities Act of 1933 § 12[a](2)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006).
172. See, e.g., Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,770.
173. See Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 3-4; DPW Letter, supra note 116, at 19.
174. Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 3-4.
175. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2007).
176. Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 3 n.10.
177. Id. at 4.
178. Reform Rules, supra note 79, at 44,770.
179. Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 15-16.
180. Id. at 16 (citing The Regulation of Securities Offering, Securities Act Release No.
7606A, Exchange Act Release No. 40632A, Investment Company Act Release No.
23519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67174, at 67,232 (Dec. 4, 1998)).
181. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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ments. 182 Because the SEC failed to address this important issue ade-
quately, it is unclear how the reasonable care defense will be pleaded
with respect to free writing prospectuses in the new fluid offering
environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Gustafson marked one great shift in section 12(a)(2) litigation. The
liberalization of the offering rules, and, most notably, the allowance of
free writing prospectuses, may mark a similarly huge shift. However, it
remains to be seen in what direction that shift will move. Arguments can
be made that an increase in litigation is sure to result, because cross-lia-
bility for underwriters and uncertainty with respect to the reasonable care
defense provide opportunities to ready plaintiffs. It seems such a shift
comports with the Act's original intent.183
On the other hand, it is unclear how the precedential value of Gustaf-
son will hold up in light of the SEC's decision to subject free writing pro-
spectuses-documents which in certain circumstances do not appear to
meet the definition of prospectus furthered by Gustafson-to section
12(a)(2) liability. The outcry against Gustafson was substantial, 184 and a
reexamination, with a differing result, is not out of the question. Also, a
similar problem may arise with respect to Pinter now that the SEC has, by
way of rule, categorized an issuer as a "seller" irrespective of the under-
writing arrangement.
Unfortunately, none of the answers to these questions are immediately
available, for neither a single judicial opinion nor an SEC No-Action let-
ter has yet to address the liability concerns surrounding the new offering
rules. The SEC appears fairly confident that the new rules are effecting
their intended purposes, noting that in the first year after enactment
more than 5,700 issuer free writing prospectuses were filed, though it is
unclear whether their novelty or their utility accounts for this number.1 85
It is this question, along with many others, that will be answered in the
next few years.
182. This very problem was alluded to by one commenter who worried that failing to
clarify the level of due diligence required could "result in a 'speed bump' in the offering
process." Tuttle Letter, supra note 125, at 17.
183. Cross & Prentice, supra note 67, at 363 n.133 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., supra note 42 and accompanying text.
185. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks Before the ABA Committee On
Federal Regulation Of Securities, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spchl2O1O6aln.htm) (admitting that of these 5,700,
"many of them [are] term sheets").
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